Constructions of locally decodable codes (LDCs) have one of two undesirable properties: low rate or high locality (polynomial in the length of the message). In settings where the encoder/decoder have already exchanged cryptographic keys and the channel is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm, it is possible to circumvent these barriers and design LDCs with constant rate and small locality. However, the assumption that the encoder/decoder have exchanged cryptographic keys is often prohibitive. We thus consider the problem of designing explicit and efficient LDCs in settings where the channel is slightly more constrained than the encoder/decoder with respect to some resource e.g., space or (sequential) time. Given an explicit function f that the channel cannot compute, we show how the encoder can transmit a random secret key to the local decoder using f (·) and a random oracle H(·). This allows bootstrap from the private key LDC construction of Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai (ICALP, 2007), thereby answering an open question posed by Guruswami and Smith (FOCS 2010) of whether such bootstrapping techniques may apply to LDCs in weaker channel models than just PPT algorithms. Specifically, in the random oracle model we show how to construct explicit constant rate LDCs with optimal locality of polylog in the security parameter against various resource constrained channels.
Introduction
Consider the classical one-way communication setting where two parties, the sender and receiver, communicate over a noisy channel that may corrupt parts of any message sent over it. The goal is to design good error correcting codes, which are invertible transformations of the messages into codewords such that the original message is recoverable from the corrupted corresponding codeword. The design of "good" codes critically rely on the nature of the channel. Historically, there have been two major lines of work associated with modelling the channel behavior. In Shannon's symmetric channel model, the channel corrupts parts of the codeword independently at random with some fixed probability By contrast, Hamming's adversarial channel model corrupts the codeword in a worst case manner subject to an upper bound on the total number of corruptions. These models are viewed as extreme ways to model channel behavior. A coding scheme designed for a Shannon channel would not necessarily work in settings where the error patterns are correlated e.g., burst-errors. By contrast, a coding scheme designed for a Hamming channel will work for any channel subject to the same upper bound on the total number of corruptions. However, the task of designing a coding scheme for a Hamming channel is potentially more difficult as we have to deal with arbitrary error patterns -even ones that could not occur in nature because the calculations are too complicated.
Lipton [Lip94] introduced the adversarial computationally bounded model, where the channel was viewed as a Hamming channel restricted to bounded corruption by a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. The notion of adversaries being computationally bounded is well-motivated by real-world channel that have some sort of limitations on its computation i.e., we expect any error pattern we encounter in nature can be modeled by some (possibly unknown) PPT algorithm. In fact, even by modelling the channel as a PPT algorithm, we are arguably significantly overestimating the computational capability of the channel. For example, if the channel has reasonably small latency, say 10 seconds, and the world's fastest single core processor can evaluate 10 billion instructions per second then the depth of any (parallel) computation performed by the channel is at most 100 billion operations. This view of modelling the channel as more restricted than just PPT was further explored by Guruswami and Smith [GS16] who studied channels that could be described by simple (low-depth) circuits. Remarkably, even such a simple restriction allowed them to design codes that enjoyed no public/private setup assumptions, while matching the Shannon capacity using polynomial time encoding/decoding algorithms. Thus it seems natural to ask whether layering other simple, well-motivated restrictions on channels allows for improved construction of error correcting codes.
In this work we introduce resource bounded adversarial channels to represent practical channels, motivated by two main observations. First, we observe that all corruptions must be made by the channel before the receiver is handed the codeword. Thus if the receiver is guaranteed delivery of the message in a specific time frame (recall our low latency channel example), then all corruptions must be made within this time frame. In particular, we argue that such a channel can be viewed as sequential time bounded -the channel may perform computation in parallel but the total depth is bounded. Second, we argue that the class of bounded space (or space-time) channels will also be sufficiently expressive to model any corruption patterns that are observed in nature e.g., correlated error patterns, burst-errors.
Against such resource bounded channels we consider settings captured by the general scenario where large volumes of data are transmitted to multiple users, but specific users are only interested in certain parts of the data. It would thus be more efficient for the receiver to read only a small section of the message to recover the desired part of the data. Codes that allow efficient recovery of only a small part of the message are called locally decodable codes (LDCs) and have found remarkable applications throughout various fields, notably private information retrieval schemes [BI01, CKGS98, KO97] , psuedo-random generator constructions [BFNW91, STV01] , self-correcting computations [DJK + 02, GLR + 91], PCP systems [BFALS91] and fault tolerant storage systems [KT00] .
Recently, Ostrovsky, Pandey and Sahai [OPS07] introduced efficient LDC constructions subject to the assumption of cryptographic keys being exchanged prior to the protocol. However, such an assumption can be restrictive e.g., it is unlikely that any two random users on the internet have exchanged private keys. In their computationally simple adversarial model, Guruswami and Smith [GS16] achieved strong error-correcting code constructions with no setup assumptions, by bootstrapping off codes that required such setups. A natural open question raised by Guruswami and Smith [GS16] was whether their ideas could be extended for LDCs to remove the setup assumptions of [OPS07] . In this work, we answer this question in the affirmative for classes of computationally bounded channels. Specifically, in the random oracle model [BR93, KM15] , we give a novel framework for designing LDCs with desirable properties against resource bounded channels. We emphasize that the techniques of our framework may be used to solve various other coding theoretic problems against these new types of adversarial channels.
Locally Decodable Codes
We consider the setting where sender S encodes a message x into a codeword y using an encoding algorithm so that when y is sent over noisy channel C, which then hands over the possibly corrupted codeword y to R, who then uses a decoding algorithm to obtain the original message. We denote x ∈ Σ k and y ∈ Σ K where Σ is the alphabet. Denote the alphabet size as q = |Σ|. We consider the model where y corresponds to y with some symbols replaced with others in Σ. The term corruptions refers to such symbol replacements within y, with a single corruption meaning single symbol replacement, so that y ∈ Σ K . The encoding and decoding algorithms are denoted by Enc : Σ k → Σ K and Dec : Σ K → Σ k . We use the terms sender, encoder and encoding algorithm interchangeably, and similarly for receiver, decoder and decoding algorithm.
A code is an encoder-decoder pair. The information rate or simply rate of the code is the ratio k/K, so that a lower rate corresponds to a lower amount of information redundancy introduced by the code. The message length, codeword length, and alphabet size characterize a coding scheme, notationally represented as a (k, K) q -coding scheme. Coding schemes with high rate and low alphabet size are desired.
An error correcting code allows the decoder to recover the entire original message x by reading the entire y . It is also possible to construct codes that only needs to read a few symbols of y rather than the entire message to recover a small part of the message. Such codes are called as locally decodable codes (LDC), and will be the focus of this work. An LDC has locality , error rate ρ and error correction probability p if any character of x may be recovered with probability at least p by making at most queries to y , even when the channel corrupts ρ fraction of all symbols of y to generate y . The term locality is interchangeable with query complexity to denote . Notationally, the above coding scheme is said to be a ( , ρ, p)-LDC. When ρ and p are clear from context (as constants), the scheme may be referred to as an -LDC. Naturally, LDCs with low locality, high error rate, and high error correction probability are desired.
Contributions
We introduce resource bounded adversarial channels as a novel, well-motivated bridge between the two extreme classical models. Furthermore, in the random oracle model, we give a framework for designing good locally decodable codes against resource bounded adversarial channels by bootstrapping existing private LDC constructions. The framework assumes no apriori private or public key setup assumptions, and allows for explicit LDCs over the binary alphabet 1 with constant rate against classes of resource bounded adversaries admitting safe functions e.g., intuitively the function H t+1 (x) is a safe function for the class of time-bounded adversaries since it is not possible to evaluate the function using fewer than t sequential operations. We show how to construct safe functions for several classes of resource bounded channels including time bound, space bound and cumulative memory cost bound channels in the parallel random oracle model.
Our local decoder can decode correctly with high probability after examining at most O f (κ) bits of the corrupted codeword, where κ is the security parameter 2 and f (κ) is any function such that f (κ) = ω(log κ) e.g., f (κ) = log 1+ε κ or f (κ) = log κ log log κ. This matches a lower bound given by [OPS07] for private LDCs, which also holds for our setting. Thus we achieve optimal locality, improving upon the state of the art comparable private LDCs which require ω(log 2 κ) query complexity for multiple rounds of communication 3 . By contrast, state of the art LDC constructions for Hamming channels have very high locality e.g., O 2 √ log n log log n [KMRS17] . Our codes are robust against constant fraction of corruptions, and are non-adaptive i.e. all the queries made by the decoder are independent of each other, a property which may be desired when it is beneficial to submit all local decoding queries in a single batch. Our constructions stand at the intersection of coding theory and cryptography, using well-known tools and techniques from cryptography to provide notions of (information theoretic) randomness and security for communication protocols between sender/receiver. To prove the security of our constructions, we introduce a two-phase distinguisher hybrid argument, which may be of independent interest to apply to other coding theoretic problems in these resource bounded channel models.
Preliminaries

Notation
We use the notation [n] to represent the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any x, y ∈ Σ n , let HAM(x) denote the Hamming weight of x, i.e. the number of non-zero coordinates of x. Let HAM(x, y) = HAM(x − y) 1 Note that small alphabet sizes are attractive for practical channels designed to transmit bits efficiently. 2 In this paper we use the security parameter κ in an asymptotic sense e.g., for any attacker running in time poly(κ) there is a negligible function negl(κ) upper bounding the probability that the attacker succeeds. In particular, the function negl(κ) = 2 − log 1+ε κ) is negligible, but does not provide κ-bits of concrete security i.e., any attacker running in time t succeeds with probability at most t2 −κ .
3 [OPS07] gives a construction with locality f (κ) = ω(log κ) "one-time" private LDCs, but the construction needs to be modified if we want security against an attacker who can observe multiple codewords.
denote the Hamming distance between the vectors x and y. All logarithms will be base 2. For possibly non-unique vectors x 1 · · · x n , majority(x 1 · · · x n ) is the vector that appears most frequently. For any vector x ∈ Σ n , let x[i] be the i th coordinate of x. We also let x • y denote the concatenation of x with y and x ⊕ y denote the bitwise XOR of x and y. For a randomized function f (·), the notation f (·; R) will be used to denote that f (·) uses random coins R as its randomness. A function negl(κ) is said to be negligible in κ if negl(κ) ∈ o poly −1 (κ) for any non-zero polynomial poly(·).
Definitions
We will be considering adversarial channels belonging to particular constraint classes. Against such channels, in order to be able to bootstrap from codes with private setup assumptions, we need a notion of privacy without the explicit exchange of secret keys. Our notion of privacy will come from safe functions i.e. functions that are provably hard for the channel to compute. These safe functions will be defined with respect to specific classes of algorithms e.g., time-bound, space-bound etc... Intuitively, we will use safe functions to allow the sender to embed a "secret" random key into the the codeword which the channel won't be able to recover. Definition 1. We say that a function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} * is -safe for a class C of algorithms if for all A ∈ C we have
where the probability is taken over the random coins of A, the selection of an input x ∈ {0, 1} n . If the
is defined using a random oracle then the probability
taken over the selection of the random oracle H(·).
In the above definition we will usually think of as being a negligibly small parameter. We remark that in the parallel random oracle model one can construct functions with sharp thresholds on the required resources. For example, consider the function H(·) t+1 (x) which is trivial to compute using at most t + 1 sequential queries to H(·) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} 2 , but any parallel algorithm making at mostueries over t rounds succeeds with probability at most = (t 2 + tq)/2 w .
Precomputation. We first remark that Definition 1 can be extended to consider an attacker who is allowed to perform precomputation with the random oracle H(·) before receiving the input x. In particular, we could consider a pair of oracle algorithms (A 1 , A 2 ) where A
H(·)
1 (m) outputs an m-bit hint σ ∈ {0, 1} m for A 2 after making at mostueries to H(·). We could modify the definition to require that for all A 2 ∈ C we have
where the randomness is taken over the selection of x the random oracle H(·) and the random coins of A 2 . Here, A
1 (m) (precomputation) is not necessarily constrained to be in the same class C as A 2 . We remark that for k = m/w a precomputing attacker can succeed with probability at least k/2 n by having
2 (x, σ) first checks if x ∈ {1, . . . , k} and, if so, simply returns the output f H(·) (x) which is already recorded in the hint σ. Thus, we need the length n of the random nonce x to be sufficiently large to resist brute-force precomputation attacks. By contrast, if the attacker does not get to perform any precomputation then can be negligible even when n = O(1). We remark that all of the safe functions f H(·) we consider would also be secure under this stronger notion. For example, the function H t+1 (x) is -safe for = O (qt + t 2 )/2 w + qt/2 n where x is a random n bit string, A 1 may make at most q random oracle queries in total and A 2 can make at most t rounds of queries to H(·) and at mostueries in total. In our LDC constructions we select a random nonce of length |x| = Ω(log 1+ε κ) to ensure that a precomputing attackers will fail. Finally, we conclude this section by presenting some classical definitions that have been used extensively in literature for this line of work [MPSW05, OPS07] Definition 2. A (K, k) q -coding scheme C = (Enc, Dec) is a pair of encoding Enc : Σ k → Σ K and decoding Dec : Σ K → Σ k algorithms where |Σ| = q. The information rate of the scheme defined as k K is denoted as by R.
Definition 3. A (K, k) q -coding scheme C = (Enc, Dec) is an ( , ρ, p)-locally decodable code (LDC) if Dec, with query access to a word y such that HAM(Enc(x), y ) ≤ ρK, on inputs index i ∈ [k] and security parameter κ makes at most queries to y and outputs x[i] with probability at least p.
The above definition is modeled by a game which models the interactions between the channel, sender and receiver. Note that in the random oracle model, all parties are given access to a random oracle which we denote by H(·).
Definition 4. For some constraint class C and random oracle H(·), a resource bounded adversarial pROM channel A H(·) ∈ C with error rate ρ is an algorithm that interacts with a LDC (Enc 
The receiver outputs x
We say that a code (Enc H(·) , Dec H(·) ) correctly decodes from error rate ρ with high probability if for all resource bounded pROM algorithms A H(·) in the above game, for all messages x ∈ {0, 1} k , all rounds and
, where the probability is taken over the random coins of Enc H(·) , Dec H(·) , A H(·) and the choice of random oracle H(·). Furthermore we will require that the total number of rounds i.e. the maximum value of p, be bounded polynomially in the length of the messages.
Our Model
Before defining locally decodable codes against resource bounded adversaries analogous to Definition 3, we first define the following LDC security game. Let C = (Enc H(·) , Dec H(·) ) be some (K, k) q -coding scheme in the random oracle model for random oracle H(·). A resource bounded adversarial channel with error rate ρ is an algorithm that interacts with (Enc
The experiment is defined as follows: for security parameter κ
1. An attacker chooses a message x ∈ Σ k and an index i ∈ [k] and sends it to an honest party.
2. The honest party computes y = Enc H(·) (x, κ) ∈ Σ K and hands y back to the attacker.
3. The channel A H(·) uses some algorithm with bounded resources to corrupt at most ρK entries of y in the pROM to obtain a word y ∈ Σ K .
4. The honest party Dec H(·) is given query access to y and computes
5. The output of the experiment is determined as follows:
If the output of the experiment is 1 (resp. 0), the channel is said to win (resp. lose) against C.
We now formally define an LDC against an adversarial channel with bounded resources.
) is an ( , ρ, p, )-locally decodable code (LDC) with respect to class C of algorithms if for all A H(·) ∈ C with error rate ρ,
and such that Dec H(·) makes at most queries to the corrupted codeword.
We remark that our codes need not require each message have the same length. Jumping slightly ahead, longer messages only need proportionally longer repetition codes to guarantee transmittance of the secret key. However for the sake of presentation, we use notation for fixed length messages.
Constructions
In this section, we provide formal details for our framework that provides explicit and efficient LDCs against adversarial resource bounded channels. We assume familiarity of private LDCs and code scrambling, whose details are restated in Appendix E and D respectively. We begin by discussing safe functions defined in Section 2.2 and give several examples of such functions in Section 3.1. We then show how allowing an encoder/decoder pair with enough resources to compute safe functions can effectively generate a random shared secret key between the pair. This secret key can then be bootstrapped into existing private LDC constructions to give codes against resource bounded adversaries. Our final constructions are given in Section 3.2 and the main proof in Section 3.3.
Using Safe Functions
Recall that for a class C of resource bounded algorithms, S C denotes a safe function i.e. providessecurity against all algorithms of the class. For some input x to A H(·) ∈ C, we will be interested in bounding the probability of the undesirable event where the A H(·) queries the random oracle at any string of the form y • S C (x) with y ∈ {0, 1} log 2 α . In the absence of such an event, H(S C (x)) would information theoretically appear random to A H(·) . Lemma 1 shows that such an event may only happen with negligible probability q where q is the total number of random oracle queries. Assuming that A H(·) never the random oracle at any point of the form y • S C (x) with y ∈ {0, 1} log 2 α we can view each H(y • S C (x)) as a fresh w-bit string. Thus, we can obtain a random wα-bit string by concatenating all of the labels H(y • S C (x)) for each y ∈ {0, 1} log 2 α .
Definition 6. For random oracle H(·) the expansion family of functions {E
, where the prefix i ∈ [α] of x for each oracle query in the definition is expressed in binary using log 2 α bits.
Lemma 1. For a some class C of resource bounded algorithms, let bad A be the event that on some input x A H(·) ∈ C queries the random oracle at α • S C (x) for any α > 0. Then Pr[bad A ] ≤ q , where q is the number of oracle queries made by A H(·) .
Proof. We prove the claim by a reduction argument. By way of contradiction, let there exist a B H(·) ∈ C such that on input string x, B H(·) makesueries to the random oracle H(·) and Pr[bad B ] > q . We construct an adversary A H(·) as follows: on input x, the adversary • Keeps track of allueries by which B H(·) queries the random oracle
, returns the suffix of length |S C (x)| from one of theueries selected uniformly at random However, we know that B H(·) queries the random oracle at α • S C (x) with probability > q . Since A
> , which contradicts the definition of safe function.
Framework for LDCs against Resource Bounded Channels
At a high level, our approach is bootstrap the techniques used in the construction of one-time private key locally decodable codes [OPS07] (see Theorem 6 in the appendix for a formal statement) to obtain codes against resource bounded adversaries using safe functions. (defined in section 2.2). Specifically, our aim will be to achieve codes having no asymptotic loss in rate, query complexity or success probability of Theorem 6. Furthermore, we do not want any private (or public) key setup assumptions, and aim for codes that may be used for multiple (polynomial) rounds of communication.
In order to achieve this, our encoding algorithm will first sample a random seed r of any length f (κ) where f (κ) = ω(log κ). An encoding of r will be included in the final codeword, thus our decoder will also have access to the random seed (Lemma 6 shows that we can achieve this reliably while maintaining small locality). Directly using the randomness of r in our coding scheme will not be useful since the adversarial channel can decode r from the final codeword and use this knowledge to gain significant advantage over the honest parties. To overcome this, we exploit the existence of a safe functions against such channels. Assuming the channel belongs to class C, even if it recovers r from the codeword, it will be unable to compute S C (r) by definition of the safe function. We then generate random coins by querying an expansion function w.r.t. the random oracle at the point S C (r), an event which the attacker may succeed at doing with only negligible probability. Note that since the decoder also has access to r, it may also compute the random coins using exactly the same procedure. Thus we now have effective shared private randomness between the encoder and decoder, which may be used to generate an effectively secret key between the pair. This reduces the problem to the setting of (one-time) private locally decodable codes, for which we may use the techniques of [OPS07] (Theorem 1). Figure 1 gives a high level overview of our encoding algorithm.
We will first describe the encoding of the random seed r. It is important to note that the exact recovery of the entire r is crucial for correct decoding. Indeed even if a single bit of r is incorrectly decoded, the decoder may fail to decode correctly. At the same time, we need to ensure that there is no loss in the overall locality during recovery of r. Our approach against these issues is to pick the length of the seed to be small, encode it using a repetition code by repeating r multiple (n JREP ) times, and then encoding each repetition of r into c J using an off-the-shelf error correcting code with constant error and information rates. Now, in order to disrupt decoding of the copy, the attacker would need to corrupt a constant fraction of the bits of c J . This will allow us to upper bound the number of corrupted blocks and thus lower bound the probability of correct decoding to be high. At the same time, reading an entire c J to decode to r would only result in a constant factor loss in the locality. We thus have the following lemma, the proof of which is included in appendix B Lemma 2. There exists a (k, K JREP ) 2 -coding scheme
−Ω(α) ) for some high constant α, and
Lemma 2 will guarantee that both the encoder/decoder have access to the same (correct) random seed. Now, we will use an expansion function on the value of the seed passed through the safe function w.r.t. the channel. Since the channel cannot compute this value, we have private randomness, thereby reducing the setting to that of private LDCs (Appendix E) We make use of the following theorem:
and κ is the security parameter.
As a final remark before giving our final constructions, we note that we will be using the expansion function E
. Such a value of τ generates sufficient amount of random bits for permutation and a mask for codeword of length K OPS , the secret key that the randomized algorithm GenKey OPS outputs. We now give our final framework (Enc
FINAL ) for codes against some class C of resource bounded adversarial channels. Specific instantiations of this framework for explicit codes will depend on the specific class of algorithms the resource bounded channel belongs to.
Theorem 2. Let f (κ) be any function such that f (κ) = ω(log κ). For any class C of algorithms against which there exists an C -secure function for C negligible in the security parameter κ, the code (Enc
By construction, the only queries Dec H(·) FINAL makes to the codeword are during the executions of Dec JREP and Dec OPS . We thus get query complexity FINAL = OPS + JREP . By Lemma 6, JREP = O (len r ), and by Theorem 6, OPS = O f (κ) where f (κ) = ω(log κ). Setting len r = f (κ) we get the claimed locality. Furthermore for error correction, it is sufficient to ensure that the total corruptions in the final codeword is at most the number of corruptions that the individual codes C OPS and C JREP can handle i.e. 
. Furthermore, L OPS and L JREP being equal gives a desirable information rate of
We emphasize that the proof of the decoder always succeeding with high probability will be much more involved than the above discussion, and is included in section 3.3. Our aim will be to show that no resource bounded adversary can distinguish between the encodings of Enc
FINAL against those of Enc OPS with random strings appended to them. Furthermore, even the decoder, who has no computational restrictions and gets the appropriate secret key used during the respective encoding processes may not make this distinction, thereby effectively reducing the security of our construction to that of Theorem 1 with negligible loss. We make some final notes before concluding this section.
Precomputation. We remark that steps 1-4 of Enc
FINAL may be precomputed. This may be advantageous in some settings to speed up encoding time as the sender may precompute multiple (sk FINAL , C JREP ) pairs. When a message is ready to be encoded, the sender then simply needs to generate C OPS using sk FINAL and append C JREP to generate the final codeword. However, we do note that this precomputation must be done after the selection of the random oracle, and that such precomputation is not possible for Dec
Multi-round Communication. The constructions of Theorem 1 are secure only for a single round of communication (see Appendix E for details on the round-based game between the encoder/decoder and the channel in the private LDC setting). We may generalize our model to be in terms of rounds as well, where each round runs an instance of the experiment LDC − Sec − Game defined in section 2.3. We remark that that our codes work for this generalized model, as in every round of the experiment, the encoder can sample a fresh random seed r. This is not possible via the constructions of Theorem 1 as an attacker listening to the decoder's queries may learn information about the secret key after a single round of communication. Due to this Ostrovsky et al. introduce a new construction which hides the secret key behind a layer of encryption, which in turn increases the locality of their final constructions to ω(log 2 κ). Thus our constructions (Theorem 2) improve upon the state of the art private LDCs for multi-round communication.
Optimal Locality We note that [OPS07] give a ω(log κ) lower bound to the locality of any private LDCs for multi-round communication. This lower bound comes from an attacker which randomly corrupts the codeword, and succeeds at fooling the decoder with non-negligible probability. This lower bound also holds in our defined variant of LDCs against adversarial channels. Therefore we achieve optimal query complexity.
Two-Phase Hybrid Distinguisher Argument
We now move on to proving that our codes are secure with high probability. To do so we use a two-phase distinguisher argument. We want to argue that if the channel is successful (wins the LDC − Sec − Game A,H,κ ) with non-negligible probability then we can derive a contradiction by showing that the channel can also confuse the coding scheme (Enc OPS ,Dec OPS ) of Theorem 1. We attempt to prove this via a pair of hybrids. In the first hybrid we use our original encoding scheme Enc JREP of an unrelated nonce r. We would like to argue that the two hybrids are indistinguishable, but this is only true if the distinguisher is resource constrained like the channel. Unfortunately, this does not allow us to conclude the channel fails to fool the decoder since the decoding algorithm is not resource constrained in the same way.
We address the issue by introducing a two-phase distinguisher game. In the first phase of the distinguisher game the resource constrained attacker A H(·) is either given C
(1)
JREP and outputs a corrupted codeword C b . In the second phase the distinguisher D is given the initial message x, the corrupted codeword C b along with the secret key sk b used to obtain C (b) OPS and tries to predict which hybrid encoder was used. The second phase distinguisher D is not resource-constrained in any way, but D is not given access to the random oracle. We show that any such pair (A H(·) , D) succeeds with negligible probability at best in this two-phase distinguishing game.
Intuitively, the two phase hybrid argument allows us to reason about the probability that the channel fools the honest decoder. In particular, if the channel wins the LDC − Sec − Game A,H,κ with non-negligible probability we can use the channel A H(·) in phase 1 and D can simulate the decoding algorithm (with the correct key) to distinguish between the hybrids with non-negligible probability.
For the remainder of this section, we will assume that the channel A H(·) has been fixed from some class C of PPT resource bounded adversaries. Against A H(·) , we will assume that (Enc
FINAL ) have been instantiated with the appropriate safe function S C . Here, let fail i be the event where Dec H(·) FINAL fails to output the correct x i for any x with query access to corresponding corrupted encoding y , on input index i. Let key be the event that Dec
H(·)
FINAL gets access to the correct key i.e. the key sk used by Enc
FINAL . In order to bound the probability of the failure event, we will be first interested in bounding the probability of fail i conditioned on event key and claim that this probability is negligibly small. We will prove the claim using a hybrid argument. At a high level, we consider two hybrid encoders Enc 
1 is equivalent to appending the output encoding of Enc OPS with a random string. Thus Enc
1 will get the secret key sk 1 as input, and will assume that the decoder has access to this key. The main argument will be to show that under corruptions by any resource bounded PPT adversary, the encoding schemes will not be distinguishable with non-negligible probability to any distinguisher given the key sk used during encoding. We define the two hybrid encoders as follows:
0 (x, κ):
1. r := random seed sampled from {0, 1} 
1 (x, κ, sk 1 ). Here sk 1 is the secret key used in step 3 of Enc
With respect to the above experiment, we define the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair as follows:
Where the probability is taken over the randomness of D, A H(·) and the selection of the random oracle H(·). Just as in Lemma 1 let bad A be the event where A H(·) queries the random oracle at position c • S C (r) where r is the random seed chosen by the encoding scheme chosen during some execution of the game and c is any constant expressed in binary. Note that if b = 1 during this game execution, bad A does not give attacker access to the secret key since sk 1 is given as input to Enc The next proposition follows from the observation that conditioning on the event bad not occurring, the secret key sk b used during the encoding process remains (information theoretically) private to both the adversary and the distinguisher. To the pair, the encoding schemes are thus (information theoretically) identical to Enc OPS , and any advantage on distinguishing the encoding schemes would allow the pair to distinguish between random strings.
The following lemma shows that the advantage for any attacker-distinguisher pair is negligible. Proof. Consider some execution of the game Exp A,D,H,x,κ . By conditional probability, the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair may be given as follows:
By Proposition 1, we may view the event of succ conditioned on bad not occurring as an unbiased random choice. Thus
This allows us to bound the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair by a factor of the probability of event bad occurring as follows
Therefore by lemma 1, the advantage of the attacker-distinguisher pair for the execution of Exp A,D,H,x,κ is at most qε 2 .
Let fail i,b be the event for Dec OPS fails to decode correctly with probability at least p on challenge index i, for any message x encoded with hybrid encoder Enc
, given the key used during encoding. Thus, if C b was the encoding output for some x by hybrid b using key sk b , we have Then, the following lemma states that the failure probabilities of Dec OPS on both the hybrid encoders will be very close. Note that the computationally intensive step 1 of D is possible since we assume no computational restrictions. Thus by conditional probability, the advantage of distinguisher D paired with any A H(·) ∈ C may be given as follows:
Where the second last equality is by definition of the distinguisher D . Furthermore, by our initial assumption |p 0 − p 1 | > qε, which implies that the Adv A,D is strictly greater than Proof. Recall that by Lemma 6, the probability of incorrectly decoding the random seed is bounded by e −α , where α is a large constant. Note that once the random seed is decoded, the original key used during the encoding of the message can be computed deterministically by the decoder. Thus Pr[key] is also bounded by e −α . Furthermore, conditioning on the decoder having the key, Corollary 1 bounds the probability of incorrect decoding as at most q + 2 − OPS . By conditional probability, we have the following
where the final inequality follows from Lemma 6 and Corollary 1.
Constructing Safe Functions
In this section we provide several examples of safe functions in the parallel random oracle model (pROM) [AS15] . We first define the parallel random oracle model and introduce several cost metrics which measure the resources used by a pROM algorithm A H(·) .
Parallel Random Oracle Model
Computation in the pROM proceeds in rounds. Each round ends when the algorithm A outputs a batch of random oracle queries to be answered in parallel and a new round begins when the attacker receives the answer(s) to this batch of queries. In between rounds the A may perform arbitrary computation. Formally, in the initial round the pROM algorithm A takes input x performs some arbitrary computation about outputs a state σ 1 and list u 1 = (u 
to denote the sequence of states (and oracle queries) output when we run the pROM attacker A(x) on input x fixing the random oracle H(·) and fixing A's random coins R. Figure 2 defines the resources we will consider as characterizing the cost of a particular execution trace T = Trace A,R,H (x). We can define the time (resp. space) cost as time(T ) = t (resp. space(T ) = max i≤t |σ i |). Similarly, the space time cost measures the product space − time(T ) = t·max i≤t |σ i | and cumulative memory complexity measures CMC(T ) = t i=0 |σ i |. Intuitively, cumulative memory complexity captures the amortized space time complexity of function that we want to evaluate many times in parallel [AS15] . Finally, the cumulative query cost is For a resource R listed in Figure 2 , the term R complexity will refer to a upper bound on resource R.
Cost Metrics
CQ(T ) = t i=1 | u i |. Resource Notation Definition Time time(T ) t Space space(T ) max t i=0 |σ i | Space-Time ST(T ) space(T ) · time(T ) Cumulative memory CMC(T ) t i=0 |σ i | Cumulative query CQ(T ) t i=0 u i
Definition 7. (Resource Bound Algorithms)
We use C CQ,q to refer to set set of all pROM algorithms A with the property that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·) and all random strings R we have CQ(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ q. We use C space,M,q ⊂ C CQ,q to refer to the subset of all pROM algorithms A with the additional constraint that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·) and all random strings R we have CQ(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ q and space(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ q. Similarly, C time,T,q ⊂ C CQ,q (resp. C space−time,S,q ⊂ C CQ,q ) refers to subset of all pROM algorithms A with the additional constraint that for all inputs x, random oracles H(·) and all random strings R we have time(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ T (resp. space − time(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ S). The definition of C CMC,M,q is symmetric -we add the additional constraint that CMC(Trace A,R,H (x)) ≤ M for all x, R, H(·).
The assumption that the channel is resource constrained with respect to one or more of the above resources (time/space/cmc etc...) is natural in most real word settings. For example, if a low latency channel uses A H(·) to compute the corruptions to an encoded message then we can assume that plausibly assume that the attacker A ∈ C time,M,q is time bounded -M denotes the maximum number of sequential evaluations of H(·) before the corrupted codeword must be delivered. It would also be reasonable to assume that the total number of q is polynomial in the relevant parameters. One can also argue that in most practical settings the channel A will have other resource constraints e.g., space-bounded etc. In general one can define complexity classes for various combinations of resource constraints -see definition 8. Figure 2 , the constraint class C R,M is the set of all pROM A H(·) such that A H(·) is R-bounded with constraints M. Here, a pROM algorithm is said to be R-bounded with constraints M if for all i ≤ p and on all inputs x, random coins R and random oracles H(·) we have
memory hard function scrypt is maximally memory hard. In particular, scrypt N can be computed in sequential time N , but any pROM attacker evaluating the scrypt function f H(·) has cumulative memory complexity at least Ω(N 2 w). Thus, scrypt could be used to obtain safe functions for the classes C CMC,S,q and C space−time,S,q -observe that CMC(T ) ≤ space − time(T ) for any execution trace T .
Sequentially Hard Function
The hash iteration function f (x) = H(·)x t+1 , defined recursively as
, is a simply example of a safe function for the class C time,T =t,q of time bounded attackers -see Claim 1. The trade-off is sharp since it it trivial to compute f (x) in sequential time t + 1. This is a desireable property in our context since the encoder/decoder both need to compute f (x) for a random input x. We remark that the proof of Claim 1 is very similar to an argument of Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] . Our bound is slightly tighter, but less general. Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] proved that any pROM algorithm running in time t can produce an arbitrary H-sequence with probability at most O(q 2 /2 w ). We can reduce the bound to O(qt/2 w ) since the attacker needs to compute a specific H-sequence i.e., L 1 , . . . , L t+1 with
i . In general, we may have q t.
Claim 1. Let f (x) = H(·) t+1 (x) and let = (t + 1)t/2 w+1 + (qt + 1)2 −w then the function f is -safe for the class C time,T =t,q .
Thus, the probability of the event COL that L i = L j for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t + 1 is at most 2 −w t+1 j=1 (j−1) = (t+1)t/2 w+1 . We say that a particular random oracle query u in round i is lucky if the output is H(·)u = L j but the label L j−1 had not previously been observed as the output to any earlier random oracle query. If i denotes the maximum index such that L i has been observed as a random oracle output then the probability that a particular query u is lucky is at most Pr[H(·)u ∈ {L i+2 , . . . , L t+1 }|COL] = (t−i)2 −w ≤ t2 −w . Conditioning on the event COL that no collisions occur we can apply union bounds to show that, except with probability qt/2 2 , there are no lucky queries. If there are no lucky queries then after t sequential rounds the output L t+1 = f (x) can be viewed as a uniformly random and the probability that the attacker outputs f (x) is at most 2 −w in this case.
If we let r denote the maximum number of sequential calls to H(·) that can be evaluated in a second 4 then we could set t = r × L max where L max denotes the maximum latency of the channel. Note that the encoder/decoder would need require time marginally higher than the latency L max +1/r ≈ L max to compute H t+1 (x).
Graph Labeling Functions
We first define a labeling function f G,H (x), given a graph G, a hash function H, and an input x.
Definition 9. Given a DAG G = (V = [N ], E) and a random oracle function H : Σ * → Σ w over an alphabet Σ, we define the labeling of graph G as L G,H : Σ * → Σ * . In particular, given an input x the (H, x) labeling of G is defined recursively by
where v 1 , . . . , v d are the parents of v in G, according to some predetermined lexicographical order. We define
We omit the subscripts G, H, x when the dependency on the graph G and hash function H is clear.
The graph labeling function can be used to construct safe functions for several different classes of resource bounded adversaries. In particular, the resources necessary to compute f G,H in the pROM are tightly linked to the black pebbling cost of the DAG G.
Parallel Black Pebbling Game. A legal (parallel) pebbling P = (P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P t ) of a DAG G = (V, E) consists of a sequence of pebbling configurations P i ⊆ V -representing the set of labels L G,H,x (v) which are stored in memory at time i. We start with no pebbles on the graph P 0 = ∅, and can remove pebbles from the graph (free memory) at any time. For any newly pebbled node v ∈ P i+1 \ P i it must be the case that parents(v) ⊆ P i where parents(v) := {u : (u, v) ∈ E}. Intuitively, this is because we cannot compute L G,H,x (v) unless each of the dependent values L G,H,x (u) for each u ∈ parents(v) is already available in memory. In the parallel version of the black pebbling game there is no constraint on the number of new pebbles P i+1 \ P i that can be placed on the graph in each round. The space cost of a pebbling P is defined as space(P ) := max i |P i | and the space complexity of a graph is space(G) = min P space(P ). The space-time (resp. cumulative cost) cost of a pebbling P is the product space − time(P ) := time(P ) × space(P ) (resp. CC(G) = i |P i |). We remark that CC(G) ≤ space − time(G). [HPV77] showed that any static DAG G on N nodes with constant indegree can be pebbled with at most (G) = O(N/ log N ) pebbles.
Pebbling Reductions In the appendix we prove that if G ≥ s and S = mw/2 then f G,H is safe for the class C space,S,q . The pebbling reduction is conceptually very similar to the reduction of Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] who proved that CMC(f G,H ) = Ω(CC(G) · w) i.e., if the graph G has high cumulative pebbling cost then f G,H is safe for the class C CMC,M,q , and by extension safe for the class C space−time,M,q ⊆ C CMC,M,q . In particular, given an execution trace Trace A,R,H (x) for an algorithm A H(·) (x) computing f G,H (x) we can (whp) extract a legal pebbling P = (P 1 , . . . , P t ) for G and then use an extractor argument to show that |σ i | /w ≥ |P i |/2 during each round i -otherwise we could derive a contradiction by using the extractor to compress the random oracle. Thus, to construct a safe function one simply needs to find a graph G with sufficiently large pebbling cost.
Related Work
Many existing code constructions consider an underlying channel that can only introduce a bounded number of errors, but has an unlimited time to adversarially decide the positions of these errors. These codes are therefore resilient to any possible error pattern with a bounded number of corruptions, corresponding to Hamming's error model, and are safe for data transmission. However, this resiliency to the worst-case error leads to coding limitations and some possibly undesirable tradeoffs. On one hand, current constructions for LDCs that focus on efficient encoding can obtain any constant rate R < 1 while simultaneously being robust to any constant fraction δ < 1−R of errors and using O 2 √ log n log log n queries for decoding [KMRS17] . On the other hand, codes that focus on low query complexity obtain blocklength that is subexponential in the message length while using a constant number of queries q ≤ 3 [Yek08, Efr12, DGY11]. Finally, if exactly q = 2 queries are desired, any code must use blocklength exponential in the message length [KdW04] . Avoiding such drastic tradeoffs between blocklength and query complexity would be attractive for other natural channels in contrast to Hamming's error model. For example, Shannon introduces a model in which each symbol has some independent probability of being corrupted; this probability is generally fixed across all symbols and known a priori. However, this probabilistic channel may be too weak to capture natural phenomenon such as bursts of consecutive error.
Thus it is reasonable to believe that many natural channels lie between these two extremes; in particular, Lipton [Lip94] argues that many reasonable channels are computationally bounded and can be modeled as PPT algorithms. In this model, [Lip94] introduced an analog to classical error-correcting codes that is robust to a fraction of errors beyond the rates provably tolerable by any code in the adversarial Hamming channel model. Similarly, a line of work [Lip94, MPSW05, GS16, SS16] have improved upon the error rate limits of classical error-correcting codes in slight variants of Lipton's computationally bounded channel model. A weakness of the codes introduced by [Lip94] is the strong cryptographic assumption that the sender and receiver share a secret random string unknown to the channel. This weakness is ameliorated by [MPSW05] , who observe that if a message is encoded by digitally signing a code that is list-decodable with a secret key, then an adversarial PPT is unlikely to produce valid signatures. Conversely, the decoder can select the unique message from the list of possible messages with a valid signature, effectively producing a public-key error-correcting codes against computationally bounded channels. Subsequently, [GS16] further removes the public-key setup assumption specifically for the channel in which either the error is independent of the actual message being sent, or the errors can be described by polynomial size circuits. Their results are based on the idea that the sender can choose a permutation and some key that is computable by the decoder but not by the channel, since it operates with low complexity. In some loose sense, their results are an example of our framework when the channel has bounded circuit complexity, i.e. the bounded resource is circuit complexity of the error.
[OPS07] obtain LDCs with constant information and error rates over the binary alphabet against computationally bounded errors, using a small number of queries to the corrupted word; specifically they can achieve any ω(log κ) query complexity, where κ is the desired security parameter. However, their results not only assume the existence of one-way functions, but also once again assume a predetermined private key known to both the encoder and decoder but not the channel, similar to [Lip94] . Analogous to the improvements of [MPSW05] for classical error codes, [HO08, HOSW11] construct public-key LDCs, assuming the existence of Φ-hiding schemes [CMS99] and IND-CPA secure cryptosystems.
Ben-Sasson et al.
[BGH + 06] introduce the concept of relaxed locally decodable codes (RLDCs) as an alternative means of decreasing the tradeoffs between rate and locality in classical LDCs. In contrast to LDCs, the decoding algorithm for RLDCs is allowed to output ⊥ sometimes to reveal that the correct value is unknown, though it is limited in the fraction of outputs in which it can output ⊥. The RLDCs proposed by Ben-Sasson et al. [BGH + 06] obtain constant query complexity and blocklength n = k 1+ . Subsequently, Gur et al. [GRR18] construct relaxed locally correctable codes (RLCCs) with attractive properties but significant tradeoffs; they propose codes with constant query complexity and error rate but block length roughly quartic in the message length as well as codes with constant error rate and linear block length, but quasipolynomial ((log n) O(log log n) ) query complexity. These parameters are significantly better than classical locally correctable codes and their results immediately extend to RLDCs, since the original message is embedded within the initial part of the encoding. However, these tradeoffs are still undesirable.
Recently, Blocki et al. [BGGZ19] study RLDCs and RLCCs on adversarial but computationally bounded channels in an effort to reduce these tradeoffs. They obtain RLDCs and RLCCs over the binary alphabet, with constant information rate, and poly-logarithmic locality. Moreover, their codes require no public-key or private-key cryptographic setup; the only setup assumption required is the selection of the public parameters (seed) for a collision-resistant hash function.
• T O(·) receives (σ i , a (i) ) as input. Here σ i is the state of the machine, and a (i) = (a
pi−1 ) are the answers to the batch of queries q i−1 of the previous round. For i = 0, σ i = x and a i = {}
• T O(·) may choose to perform arbitrary computation to update contents of its memory and output a new state σ i+1 along with a new batch of p i queries q (i) = (q
pi ) to submit to the random oracle.
• The entire batch q (i) is handed to the random oracle. This concludes the round.
T O(·) also has an output tape onto which it may append output values at any time. A special character ⊥ is designated to signal termination, and the round based interaction is said to terminate when T O(·) writes ⊥ to the end of the output. If the interaction terminates in t rounds, we call it a t-round interaction. |σ i | denotes the size of the state σ i , which is the minimum number of bits required to encode any necessary state information.
B Repetition with Justesen Codes
In this section, we will describe our encoding scheme in order to recover the random seed r used by our main constructions in section 3.2. Recall that our approach was to encode r using a repetition code by repeating r multiple (n JREP ) times, and then encoding each repetition of r into c J using an off-the-shelf error correcting code with constant error and information rates. While any constant rate error correcting code may be used, we make use of Justesen Codes:
Proof. The adversary makes a total of ρ JREP L JREP corruptions to C JREP . Let ρ J = δ J (R J ). By theorem 3, for a c J block to be non-decodable by Dec J , the adversary must make at least ρ J L J corruptions in this block. This allows us to bound the total blocks the adversary may corrupt as at most
n JREP . Thus probability of sampling a block that is non-decodable is at most
, we get that probability of sampling a block that may be recovered is at least 3/4. Making α such samples for some high odd constant α, at least 3α/4 copies may be such that they can be recovered from with probability at least 1 − e −Ω(α) using standard chernoff bounds. Furthermore, each block has size lenr R JREP = O (len r ) since our choice of codes . Thus the query complexity of sampling a constant α number of blocks is O (len r ).
The proof of lemma 2 follows directly from the above.
C Memory Bounded Adversary
In this section we show that the memory complexity of the function f G,H is characterized by the space cost space(G) in the parallel random oracle model just as Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] showed that cumulative memory complexity can be characterized by the black pebbling game.
Graph Pebbling
Given a directed acyclic graph (DAG) G = (V, E), the goal of the (parallel) black pebbling game is to place pebbles on all sink nodes of G (not necessarily simultaneously). The game is played in rounds and we use P i ⊆ V to denote the set of currently pebbled nodes on round i. Initially all nodes are unpebbled, P 0 = ∅, and in each round i ≥ 1 we may only include v ∈ P i if all of v's parents were pebbled in the previous configuration (parents(v) ⊆ P i−1 ) or if v was already pebbled in the last round (v ∈ P i−1 ).
The cumulative cost of the pebbling is defined to be |P 1 | + . . . + |P t |. Graph pebbling is a particularly useful as a tool to analyze the security of an iMHF [AS15] . A pebbling of G naturally corresponds to an algorithm to compute the iMHF. Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] proved that in the parallel random oracle model (pROM) of computation, any algorithm evaluating such an iMHF could be reduced to a pebbling strategy with (approximately) the same cumulative memory cost.
However for our purposes, we are more concerned about the space cost rather than the cumulative memory cost. The space of the pebbling is defined to be (P ) = max i |P i | and accordingly, (G) = min(P ), where the minimum is taken over all valid pebblings P .
Reduction
Similar to [AS15] our reduction uses Lemma 7 as a core building block. In particular, if the space complexity is significantly smaller than space(G) for a pROM attacker then we will be able to build an extractor that receives a small hint and predicts the random oracle output on an index contradicting Lemma 7. By contrast, a black pebbling move always corresponds to a specific random oracle query.
Lemma 7.
[DKW11] Let B be a series of random bits and let A be an algorithm that receives a hint h ∈ H and can query B at specific indices. If A outputs a subset of k indices of B that were previously not queried, as well as guesses for each of the bits, the probability there exists some h ∈ H so that all the k guesses are correct is at most |H| 2 k .
C.1 Memory and Cache in the Parallel Random Oracle Model
Before we present our reduction, we first recall the formal definition of space complexity in the pROM model. Let the state of an algorithm A H(·) at time i to be σ i , which contains the contents of the memory. Let A H(·) be a pROM attacker A H(·) who is given oracle access to a random oracle H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1}
w . An execution of A H(·) on input x proceeds in rounds as follows. Initially, the state at time 0 is σ 0 , which encodes the initial input x. At the beginning of round i the attacker is given the initial state σ i−1 as well as the answers A i−1 to any random oracle queries that were asked at the end of the last round. The algorithm A H(·) may then perform arbitrary computation and choose to update the memory, outputting a new state σ i , along with a batch of queries Q i = {q Recall that Alwen and Serbinenko [AS15] show that the computation of a function f G,H with hash function H and underlying directed acyclic graph G yields a legal black pebbling with high probability. Thus, we use A H(·) to extract a legal P = (P 1 , . . . , P t ) ∈ P (G). Given an execution trace Trace A,R,H (x), the corresponding pebbling BlackPebble H Trace A,R,H (x) = P 0 , . . . , P t is defined by setting P 0 = ∅ and define the pebbles at each subsequent time step i based on the corresponding batch of queries q i made during iteration i. We then apply the following rules:
• For each query q in batch q i , if the query has the form v, lab H,x (v 1 ), . . . , lab H,x (v d ) for some vertex v and its parents v 1 , . . . , v d , then we add a pebble to node v in P i .
• If there exists another query for v before v is used as input for a query, then v is deleted from P i .
Intuitively, at each time j, P j contains all nodes v whose label will appear as input to a future random oracle query before the label appears as the output of a random oracle query. In this manner, we define BlackPebble H Trace A,R,H (x) = P 1 , . . . , P t ⊆ V , which Alwen and Serbineneko show is legal with high probability:
Theorem 4.
[AS15] The pebbling extracted from an execution trace,
BlackPebble
H Trace A,R,H (x) ∈ P (G), is a legal black pebbling with probability at least 1 − q 2 w , where w is the label size and q is the number of queries made by Trace A,R,H .
We now show that any algorithm A H(·) that computes f G,H (x) correctly with probability at least ε has memory cost mcost dependent on the space complexity of the resulting legal black pebbling, space(P (G)). The proof uses that fact that if an attacking strategy does not yield a corresponding legal black pebbling, then the attacking strategy can be modified to form an extractor for the labels of a subset of nodes. Specifically, an extractor with access to the attacking strategy, the state of the memory, and a few select hints can successfully predict a large number of random bits, which cannot happen with high probability. The hints given to the extractor describes the positions of the random bits, and ensure these bits remain "random" (that is, we do not explicitly query these locations later). In particular, the extractor uses the hints to simulate A H(·) but the hints do not include the current state of memory σ i .
Theorem 5. Let G be a DAG with n nodes, w > 8 log n, q < 2 w/16 , and x be a fixed input. Let m = mcost(Trace A,R,H (A, x)). For any algorithm A H(·) that makes at mostueries, let HIGH(A, x) be the event that the attacker either uses Proof. Consider an instance of A H(·) that succeeds in calculating f G,H , making at mostueries. By Theorem 4, with probability at least 1 − q 2 w , we can extract a legal black pebbling from A H(·) . Conditioned on the success of the extraction of a legal black pebbling, let m = mcost(Trace A,R,H (A, x)) be the space complexity of the execution trace of the evaluation algorithm. By definition of space, there exists a time step i such that the corresponding legal black pebbling contains at least m pebbles. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that mcost q,ε (f G,H ) < mw 2 so that |σ i | < mw 2 . By construction of the pebbling, there is a set S containing m labels that appear as input for a query after time step i before they are returned as output. Moreover, there are collisions among labels with probability at most n i=1
